Archive for the 'Breakthrough Lean Transformation / Kaikaku' Category

MIT’s Message about Lean Enterprise Transformation

Sunday, April 27th, 2008

I attended MIT’s Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) conference in Boston this week. The food was better than the typical rubber chicken and the weather was better than I expect from Boston, but what I found most memorable were the three overarching messages:

1. Market leaders are good at embracing enterprise change;

2. Enterprise change requires a holistic approach that engages all stakeholders. This includes employees, suppliers, customers, unions, and investors/owners;

3. Positive enterprise change, and hence market leadership, require a foundation of organizational factors that includes: shared goals, shared knowledge, mutual respect, frequent and timely communication, and problem solving communication.

Nothing new here, right? Drucker, Senge, Kotter, Peters, Collins, Liker, Womack and others preach similar messages about managing change and achieving excellence.

What strikes me is the forum. This is the Lean Advancement Initiative Conference. Instead of 6S, we discussed stakeholders; instead of one piece flow, we learned about organizational factors; instead of root cause analysis, we got relational competence.

The underlying lesson from LAI? To achieve market leadership, the bar is raised. Kaizen events on the factory floor and improvement projects conducted by experts are not enough. LAI is telling us that we must change the game from tools and projects to holistic enterprise transformation. We must cultivate leadership which supports and drives enterprise behaviors. We must develop towering professional competence in all employees through daily training, mentoring, and coaching. And we must value our employees as long-term assets whom we engage in the continuous improvement of our company.

Identifying Waste in Your Business

Monday, February 19th, 2007

Eliminating waste, or muda, from processes is a core concept of lean. Most of us know the seven types of waste (see below), yet the trick is “learning to see” these wastes that often are ubiquitous parts of our operations. Below is a list of common symptoms for each waste. If you see the symptom, you may have an opportunity to eliminate the underlying waste.

  • Defects - Plant “hospitals”, rework loops, customer returns and complaints, cost overruns for raw materials or labor, 100% inspection (in plant or at the customer).
  • Overproduction - Often called the “mother of all muda” since it can cause or increase the incidence of the other six wastes. Look for excess inventory, AS/RS systems, large batch size, inability to meet customer demand, long or complex setups, low awareness of takt time (customer demand rate), poor quality, inflexibility, disjointed operations within a process.
  • Transportation - Fork lifts, carts, AR/RS systems, AGV systems, consumption of envelopes, boxes, shipping labels, long lead times, aisles, conveyors.
  • Waiting - Bins, queuing areas, waiting areas, chairs, in/out boxes, large batch sizes, long lead times, pallets, boxes, envelopes, stuff in the aisles.
  • Inventory - Look for reasons that people would build inventory as a quick fix to a problem: parts shortages, mura, defects, long lead times, labor standards, idle time, lack of clear build signal.
  • Motion - Safety issues like repetitive strain injuries, falls, long or inconsistent cycle times, misplaced tools, cranes, lifts and other material handling equipment
  • Overprocessing - Conformance issues with tolerances, fit, finish. Long cycle times, worker performance issues, scrap rates, standard material specifications

The Stepbrother of PDCA

Tuesday, January 23rd, 2007

Many of you know and use PDCA, the scientific method for process improvement. But are you also familiar with standardize-do-check-act (SDCA) cycle?

As explained by Masaaki Imai in his book Gemba Kaizen

“…SDCA standardizes and stabilizes the current processes, while PDCA improves them. SDCA refers to maintenance and PDCA refers to improvement; these become the two major responsibilities of management.”

Imai later continues:

“In the beginning, any new work process is unstable. Before one starts working on PDCA, any current process must be stabilized in a process often referred to as the standardize-do-check-act (SDCA) cycle.”

Before beginning a Kaizen effort, ask yourself: Is the current process fundamentally sound and aligned with customer value, but requires standardization and stabilization (SDCA)? Or shall we fundamentally transform the process altogether (PDCA)?

Are You Struggling to Improve 4%?

Wednesday, August 2nd, 2006

Reading Seth Godin’s article “The Mediocre Emergency” reminded me of a meeting I had awhile ago with the CFO of a privately held $1 billion company. I asked her about their financial goals, and she replied that they had an aggressive target to improve profits by 4% this year.

I felt their “aggressive target” was limiting, so I shared with her two facts that I hoped would shift her thinking:

1. Over 95% of her body mass consists of water.

2. Over 95% of her company’s activities consist of waste.

She was gracious and accepted fact #1 as a truth, yet balked over fact #2, and didn’t understand my overall meaning.

So I explained: “Pervasive waste in business is a fact, just like pervasive water in your body is a fact. Neither is particularly flattering, but does it make sense to deny they’re true?”

“Acknowledging that waste is pervasive in your company is critical for breakthrough thinking. For example, you have a value stream with a 5% profit margin. Let’s say that you reduce the waste in this value stream from 95% to 65%. What’s the bottom-line impact?” The CFO haltingly replied: “From a financial perspective, it would be huge. You just decreased my costs up to 30%, and increased profits by a factor of 6 or 7.”

“That’s breakthrough thinking.” I acknowledged. “But to succeed, we need your commitment and involvement as the CFO. Are you in?”

At first, she couldn’t decide if I was a lunatic or a godsend. But after spending some time with her discussing Lean thinking principles, and encouraging their executive team to talk with some of our clients, they began to see the potential. And after the first few weeks of working with us, they shifted their thinking.

Instead of struggling to increase earnings 4%, they now conservatively estimate reducing costs 30% and increasing earnings 40%.

So, are your company’s goals encouraging breakthrough thinking? Or are you still struggling with that 4%?

Crossing the Lean Rubicon

Saturday, July 15th, 2006

Over the past week or two I have been in a couple of manufacturing plants, and talked to the execs from a couple more, and there seems to be a common thread among them - first, their lean transformation is not gaining the traction and generating the results they expected, and second, they have made half hearted commitments to value stream management.

There is not a lot of doubt among the folks that set off to beome lean that the value stream - the entire process from receipt of customer order to receipt of customer payment and every step in between - must be the central focus. Most companies start down the value stream mapping path, and a few even assign someone to the job of ‘Value Stream Manager’. Very few, however, really make a fundamental shift in their management thinking.

I am more and more convinced that the real commitment to lean - the crossing of the Rubicon - is when the company (1) changes the accounting system to collect cost by value stream, rather than by cost center; and (2) breaks up the support staff fiefdoms and assigns the staffers to work for the Value Stream Managers.

Not much is going to come from value stream optimization efforts when the basic financial planning and control tools are still focused on isolated operations. And not much is going to happen when the people tasked with the job of managing the value streams do not control any of the management resources needed to do the job.

Willingness to restructure the cost system and break up the support staff organizations is very much an acid test of senior management understanding of lean, and commitment. Everything up to that point can be controlled and tempered by the existing management infrastrcuture - the new value stream managers, or participants in kaizen events and six sigma projects can’t rock the old boat too much. But when the power tools of management are put in the hands of people with a value stream focus, that is another story all together. Change will take place radically and quickly, and the change will not be easily undone.

Change Or Die

Wednesday, June 28th, 2006

Ford has launched a remarkable series of videos documenting their introspective look at themselves. It is very much worth the couple of minutes to watch the first installment. You can take a look by clicking here .

The comments from a number of people at Ford concerning their focus on the wrong competitors - GM and Chrysler, rather than Toyota and Honda - and their product and quality shortcomings reflect a healthy willingness to deal honestly with their situation. There is little doubt that they have named their effort acurately - Change Or Die.

I don’t believe, however, they have asked “Why?” enough times. One lean tenet is that you usually have to ask why five times before you get to the root cause of a problem. I know a number of Ford management folks, as well as people who work at Toyota and Honda. The Ford people are no less intelligent or committed to success than the people at their Japanese competitors. It has long been my premise that the problems that exist at just about every big manufacturer - Ford and GM are just the ones most in the public eye - are a product af the basic management structure in which they operate.

It is hard for me to believe that, no matter how inbred the Detroit automotive culture is, they have not been acutely aware of Toyota. I don’t believe that the problem at Ford or anywhere else is so simple that merely telling people to care more - change or die - will solve it.

Ford, GM and all of the traditional American manufacturers manage with an infrastructure that is fundamentally different from the management infrastructure at Toyota, Honda and the truly lean companies. No matter how much the Ford people care, and no matter how hard they work to solve their problems, they cannot continue to manage themselves by the old DuPont ROI model with MRP/ERP systems, labor focused performance metrics, functional organizational structures, standard costs, and investment decisions driven by the same old accounting methods and hope to compete with the lean companies.

Traditional manufacturers are not being out-worked by the lean manufacturers, nor is their problem a lack of caring. They are being out-managed. The only solution is a fundamental change in how they manage.

The Ford initiative is a good start, but asking why a few more times will get them to the heart of the matter where sustainable improvement can begin.

Lessons From An Itinerant Manufacturing Bum

Friday, May 19th, 2006
Just about everyone is familiar with the story of Alfred Nobel, inventor of dynamite and namesake of the famous Prizes - or at least they are familiar with one version of it. The standard version of the tale is that he invented dynamite for construction purposes, then, shocked at how the world was using it to blow each other up instead of to build things, he bequeathed his fortune to establish the Prize to promote world peace. Maybe that’s how it happened and maybe not. Al’s old man was a military contractor for the Czar of Russia and the family fortune was made as a result of Immanuel Nobel’s insight into good ways to blow people up, so how bothered Alfred was is a bit questionable. In any event, whether it was a fit of conscience or, more likely, a futile attempt to score points with a woman named Bertha von Suttner, he changed his tune.

Gary Hamel seems to be in the midst of a similar journey, although I have no reason to think his motives are to impress some woman. Hamel, for those who do not know of him, is regarded as perhaps the greatest management wizard alive - the heir apparent to Peter Drucker. He describes himself as “the world’s most profound business thinker“, so modesty is obviously not one of his strong points, but there are plenty of other folks around who share that view of him. The Economist calls him “the world’s reigning strategy guru.” This mantle of genius has been placed on him largely on the strength of an article he wrote for the Harvard Business Review back in 1990 titled “The Core Competence of the Corporation”. The one sentence summary is that a company should figure out what it is good at and concentrate on doing that thing very well, and not worry too much about getting good at the rest.

Just as the invention of dynamite for construction purposes inadvertently made Alfred Nobel the Father of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the origination of the concept of core competency turned Hamel into the Father of Outsourcing. I don’t think Mr. Hamel intended for just about every big corporation to take him so seriously that they would use his theory to outsource every company function except the one thing they figured was their ‘core competence’, but that’s what happened. I especially don’t think he expected them to decide that their true core competence was finance or advertising, instead of value adding activities like engineering and manufacturing. Regardless, Hamel’s theory of core competence has probably hollowed out more factories than Nobel’s dynamite ever did.

Hamel’s scheme was so wrong - at least the standard corporate application of his scheme - that even the fellows at Wharton are questioning the idea of breaking up value streams to isolate and only worry about core competencies. It would have saved the whole bunch of them a lot of time and effort (not to mention a bit of inconvenience all of this caused for a few million people who lost their manufacturing jobs) had they all just read a couple of articles about lean.

Better late than never, however. Like Nobel with his Prize to atone for some of the damage done, Gary Hamel is opening up a ‘Management Innovation Lab’ at the London Business School this Fall so they can rethink the whole mess. I think that he is going to get it right this time. I think that Mr. Hamel may be in the right position at the right time to have history remember him not as the guy who gutted manufacturing with his hair brained core competence notions, but as the guy who tossed Alfred Sloan out of manufacturing once and for all.

I am not a “profound management genius”, nor am I a “strategy guru”. Anyone who would pay me the ridiculous sums that Gary Hamel and his peers get to give a speech is out of their mind. When asked what I am, my typical answer is that I am itinerant manufacturing bum. I have worked in just about every kind of factory at every level from machine operator to plant manager. I write, I consult and I speak from time to time to just about anyone who wants to talk about manufacturing. My formal education is pathetic. My success with lean manufacturing has been little more than standing on the shoulders of giants like Ohno and Shingo and taking credit for their genius. Rebirth of American Industry is nothing more than a compilation of the logical and obvious conclusions I came to from trying to understand why so many good, smart and conscientious manufacturing executives have failed to succeed in lean transformations. I want to make this clear before I launch into the real point of this post.

The impetus for creating the lab is a series of brilliant insights - that Toyota actually deploys a different management system, not just a different factory operating scheme - that the Sloan model has some weaknesses, including insanely trying to boil something as incredibly complicated as a factory down to a couple of simple equations - that business schools and their graduates know next to nothing about the origins and assumptions behind the management principles they memorize - that Henry Ford actually was the innovator of management principles and not just assembly lines. I know that just about all of this comes right from the pages of my book. The lesson to take, however, is not that I am a genius on par with Gary Hamel. No, the lesson is that it has taken this long for the leading guru among all of the leading strategic gurus to figure out what is patently obvious to me and all of the other itinerant manufacturing bums out there.

The bottom line: I am not a deep thinking wizard - I merely write and say what many, many manufacturing people know to be true. CEO’s can save themselves an awful lot of time and an awful lot of money by just going out into the factory and asking all of the itinerant manufacturing bums already on their payroll what is wrong and what needs to change. The alternative, I guess, is to wait a few more years, then pay Mr. Hamel’s fee to tell them.

The Will ‘O The Wisp of Value Streams

Friday, May 19th, 2006
There is a great article in CIO, which bills itself as “Australia’s Magazine for Information Executives” called Fie On Fiefdoms , summarizing the key points former COO of Microsoft, Robert Herbold, makes in his book The Fiefdom Syndrome: The Turf Battles That Undermine Careers and Companies - And How to Overcome Them. Herbold is apparently not much of a lean manufacturing guy, but he makes some great points about lean management. The conclusion I took away from the article (can’t say I’ve read the book yet) is that Value Streams do not exist - they’re not real.

When you boil his whole ‘fiefdom’ theory down, it gets back to functional organizations versus processes. Motorola preached about the ills of functional silos and Eli Godratt hammered the point that local optimization does not lead to global optimization, but call it a fiefdom, a silo or a locality, it is all the same. By whatever name, most companies are not structured along process lines. They are organized functionally. Lean is based on cross functional process optimization, but there is no formal entity in most companies called a “process”. Processes come to life when they are artificially created in a value stream map, or as the basis for a kaizen event or a six sigma project. Whatever improvements are derived from the effort are put into place, then the ‘process’ evaporates into thin air and the company goes about its business - along its functional lines.

There are no changes made to the ‘process’ because the process does not exist. The changes are actually made to individual operations within functional areas. The theory goes that, because the changes were made on the basis of their impact on the process, when everyone returns to their functional areas and incorporates those changes, the theoretical process will be better.

It sounds better in theory than in practice. The savings and improvements companies claim from kaizen and six sigma rarely show up on the bottom line because the theory has a huge, gaping hole in it - the savings generally turn out to be theoretical, rather than real, because processes are theoretical, rather than real.

It seems to me that Mr. Herbold fell into the same old trap many stumble into. He sees breaking up the ‘fiefdoms’ as a psychological, cultural, leadership sort of an issue. However, in the one specific case mentioned in the article - P&G causing confusion at Walmart because of multiple product groups each with their own agenda - the problem was solved not with culture and leadership but by changing the organizational structure of the company.

Wiremold and Danaher achieved lean success - optimizing process performance - in large measure because their processes are not theoretical - they are real. Their companies are structured around processes, or value streams instead of functional departments. The same is true at Toyota. The same was very true at Ford when lean manufacturing came to life in Highland Park.

Value Stream Mapping exercises, kaizen events and six sigma projects almost always look their best on a conference room wall chart, but save little in terms of real dollars, because there is no one responsible for the value stream, there are no individual performance metrics for the value stream, and the accounting system does not recognize the value stream. The managers and supervisors formally responsible for the functional areas - the fiefdoms - are generally doing a pretty good job. At least they are based on how the company has formally defined their jobs and measures what is ‘good’. Almost by definition, when the kaizen event or six sigma project comes up with process changes that are actually a list of changes within the ‘fiefdoms’ along the process, those supervisors are being told to do something that takes them away from ‘goodness’ as it is formally defined. Process changes that are away from goodness in the formal management structure of the company cannot last.

I should read the book out of fairness to Mr. Herbold, but if the article is a good synopsis, he has missed a fundamental point. I grew up in Cincinnati, where P&G is headquartered. P&G people are very, very smart. They are typically not petty, political, turf conscience, office politicians who can’t see or don’t care about the big picture. If they were presenting Walmart with a cacophony of P&G chatter, that is because their jobs were defined and measured in such a way that they did the best for P&G by approaching Walmart with chaos. The problem was solved not through psychology, but by management.

Herbold also broke through the ‘fiefdom’ problems at Microsoft by restructuring the accounting systems and by making data much more accessible. These tangible management changes - overhauling the basic management infrastructure - to create a customer focused, process oriented business, instead of an ROI focused, vertical/functional business - is critical to lean.

I’ve ranted quite a bit about the difference between looking lean and being lean and this is right at the heart of it. All of the Toyota tools on the shop floor save very little when the management infrastructure stays the same. Shingo Prizes for Delphi plants do not help the bottom line when the organizational structure, accounting systems, performance metrics and information flows are not radically changed to support process optimization.

I don’t care how many kaizen events you might have had, how many six sigma black belts are on the payroll, or how much value stream mapping you might have done, if I walk into your plant and cannot meet a value stream manager or see your financial reports rolling up through value streams to equal the P&L, you aren’t lean.

Excellence Is Not Enough

Wednesday, April 19th, 2006
Hey Detroit! Are you listening? Here’s how you turn things around when you are in trouble:

Step 1 is to close the excess plants and lay off the extra people. That’s not part of lean, but it is the price to pay for not being lean in the past.

Step 2 is to reorganize the company from the top all the way down through the production folks into teams focused on each value stream

Step 3 is to implement 5S in order to “clear the underbrush out of the way and allows high visibility management

Step 4 is to scrap the data collection and measurements systems, replacing them with strictly verbal communications at regular team meetings. As the relevant data needed to manage performance becomes clear, slowly bring up new reporting and metrics.

Step 5 is do some value stream mapping and selectively implement TPM and reduce set up times by 90%

Step 6 is to launch a continuing all out effort to get the people involved in business decisions at all levels, including their participation in redefining the nature of the business from providing hardware to providing solutions. Bring greater flexibility and customization to the market. Make sure people know that ““Part of their daily business is they are discussing company business, what they did yesterday, what they did right, what they did wrong and what they are going to experiment with today to make that better tomorrow.”

Step 7 is to use the millions of dollars in cost reductions, and delivery and quality improvements to begin to grow the business back. Selectively add people back into the company.

Step 8 is to lay plans in place to go after the materials management and supply chain part of things next year (That’s right - go after the suppliers last, not first)

This isn’t my idea. It is the formula followed by Rittal, a German company just outside of Dayton, Ohio that has brought itself back from a coma, if not near death, through a very impressive lean commitment. It is well worth it to read about them here, here and here. While other companies carry on about the affect of the economy and external forces on their business, Rittal says, “It’s going to be a superb year. It’s nice if the market continues to grow, but we don’t care if it does or doesn’t.” They are planning to grow by taking over the market through their superior production capabilities, so the size of the market really doesn’t matter.

As their head guy says, “Fortunately for me, 99 percent of all manufacturing companies are not anywhere near where they should be in terms of the way they manufacture and develop strategies.” I can easily picture Toyota saying that to themselves now and then. It is fortunate for the few lean companies that most of the other guys don’t get it.

The best news of all for Rittal is that the boss is probably right when he says, “We have a long way to go,” and “We have spent three years turning the company around, but we haven’t tapped into one percent of the human resource. It goes back to that lean thinking — wasted resource, wasted brain capital of our people.” So Rittal is just getting started, and the competition has given them a pretty good head start.

What particularly impressed me is that they approached lean from the opposite direction than that taken by most companies. They started with their organizational structure and made value streams the formal way they work, instead of the old functional departments the rest of us cannot seem to get past. They scrapped the data systems, thinking that just talking to each other was better than using bad data. Most companies are so dependent on computers and reports, instead of visual control and verbal communications, that such a thing would be unimaginable. Most of us would cling to the old systems with a death grip, even if we knew they were wrong, rather than operate with no computer reports.

They took on 5S and red tagging, but view it as a casual event along the way, calling it “clearing out the underbrush“. They deployed the tools of lean where they were appropriate - a value stream map here and a kaizen event there, a little TPM and some set up reductions. They don’t seem to view any of these tools as the ‘cornerstone’ of anything and they do not seem to have elevated any of the tools into any sort of a big deal.

In total, they are changing their business model and their culture, and letting the application of the lean tools fall out of that new business model wherever and whenever they are appropriate.

We have a long way to go. Ask 100 people and you get 100 different answers what world class is. My simple answer is that world-class manufacturing is the way Toyota develops and manufactures its products. It’s about lean, it’s about the total elimination of waste, it’s about speed, it’s about best practice, it’s Kaizen.” Can it be stated any better than tha? What I like best about Rittal is that they seem to view the debates we often hold within the lean community concerning the relative value of different tools and terminology as a colossal waste of time. Lean is about everything.

Says Rittal’s head guy, “Excellent for me is not enough any more. It will only get you through tomorrow. I am looking for an organization that is going to develop into something that’s going to be spoken in the same vain as a company like Toyota. That is the only way we are going to survive long term.”

The Heart of the Matter

Monday, March 20th, 2006

I hope everyone has had a chance to read the last few post Mike Wroblewski has put up over at Get Boondoggle, along with the comments he has received, especially one by a fellow named Chet Frame. Their view of lean implementation carries a lot of weight - they reflect mainstream lean thinking. They also reflect the approach to lean that has not been too successful over the last two decades. I also hope you gave my last post, Lean Manufacturing, a good read.

As I spent the morning reflecting on how to craft a response, I had one fall into my lap, compliments of a lean thinker named Bryan Lund from Energizer. Responding to a wide open question concerning the future of lean posted on NWLean, Bryan wrote:

A select number of companies will “get it” by researching the history of TPS and understanding why TPS is what it is today, by educating themselves and through deep experiential reflection. Those companies will be the most successful in the world. The bulk of the companies in the world will continue to apply the tools, always scratching the surface, never knowing what is at the heart of TPS.”

He said it perfectly. The lean community can continue to ignore the messy, complicated business systems, economic model and thorny management complications that underlie the current factory practices, or face them head on. It is certainly much easier to ignore them and simply go out and launch a kaizen project at whatever seems to be a problem in the current model. As Mr. Frame said, it is easy to see results if you go into a black room and simply start spraying white in any direction. It is much harder to try to figure out how the room that should be white got to be black in the first place, and to see to it that it does not go back to being black as soon as you finish with your white paint. For that matter, it is easier to ignore the question of whether you are even in the right room to begin with.

It is also easy, as Mr. Frame suggests, to simply ignore accounting issues. It is easy to just write things off to some inevitable, unsolvable, mysterious difference between Japanese management and culture and American management and culture. That ignores the fact that most Japanese companies are not very lean at all, but it is an easy rationalization.

I view this whole debate as Mike and Chet saying it doesn’t matter what blueprint you use to build a house. If you use Shingo’s hammers and saws, instead of Frederick Taylor and Ollie Wight’s, you will build a Toyota house no matter what blueprint you use. I think the blueprint happens to be the key to the whole thing. You can use the Toyota tools all day long, but if you are not using the right blueprint, you will not build the right house. Art Smalley is right. You can pretty much ignore the standard Toyota tools and, as long as you understand and follow the Toyota blueprint, you will build the right house.

Failure to thoroughly understand how all of the vastly complicated, tightly integrated physical, human and economic variables inherent in manufacturing work together, and how cycle time comes closest to measuring that interrelationship, can only lead, as Mr. Lund so eloquently put it, to continued application of “the tools, always scratching the surface, never knowing what is at the heart of TPS.” It will also perpetuate the 98%+ failure rate Clifford Ransom discussed.

The strongest proof of the emptiness of the tool centered approach to lean that has been so widely promoted, and that Mike is advocating, is the character of American manufacturing management. When you believe that using all of the Toyota tools is the essence of lean, the explanation for the near universal failure to achieve bottom line results always boils down to poor management character - lack of leadership, failure to respect people, middle management resistance, blah, blah, blah.

Only I know better and so do you. We have worked with these people. We know thousands of American managers, working and retired, at virtually every level of manufacturing. They are not stupid. They are not uncaring. Many of them are the most respected and generous leaders in their communities. Blaming their character is insulting and intellectually lazy. Leading the pack of those who write off the failure of the lean tool centered approach to the intellectual and moral weakness of American managers is Mr. Massaki Imai, founder of the Kaizen Institute, and the expert Mike quotes in support of his point of view.

With all due respect to Mr. Imai and the Kaizen Institute - I was a Kaizen Institute student and I learned much from the experience - they have been in business for twenty years and their customers have failed to become lean at the bottom line in proportions similar to manufacturing in general. Mr. Imai has been quick and vocal in attributing this to the poor character of American managers, and the success of Toyota to the superior character of Japanese managers.

[American] “Managers often avoid going to gemba because they don’t want to be embarrassed by their ignorance.”

“Japanese companies developed a very effective system of management, particularly in the manufacturing sectors, and the rest of the world has much to learn from these practices.”

That, is what Mr. Imai of the Kaizen Institute has to say - launch a kaizen effort at anything that looks like a problem and, if it does not turn you into Toyota, it is because you are more ignorant than a Japanese manager. Mr. Imai thinks his customers are the problem. He and the other lean ‘experts’ should quit blaming the customers of the lean message for the failure of a tool centered lean message to provide them with bottom line results.

Mike would like to “avoid debates and arguments about lean like this one and just start improving.” Twenty years of kaizen have not improved much in American factories. Manufacturing is in trouble. Rather than avoid the debate, I think we better broaden and step up the intensity of it before we run out of time, starting with the fact that the widespread message that the old formula of Kaizen + Lean Thinking = Lean has a twenty year track record of failure in America.